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October 2000
Vol. 12, No. 5 (A)
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT
May 1995 Vol. 7, No. 5
UNITED STATES
U.S. BLINDING LASER WEAPONS
Contents
I. INTRODUCTION 2
II. BACKGROUND ON TACTICAL LASER WEAPONS 3
III. WEAPONS TO BLIND OR TO DESTROY SENSORS? 5
IV. BLINDING AS A METHOD OF WARFARE 6
V. STATUS OF U.S. TACTICAL LASER WEAPON PROGRAMS 7
Special Missions for Blinding Lasers 8
Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) (AN/PLQ-4 and AN/PLQ-5) 8
Saber 203 Grenade Shell Laser Intruder Countermeasure System 9
Dazer 10
Stingray Combat Protection System (AN/VLQ-7) 11
Outrider Combat Protection System 12
Perseus Optical Munition 13
Cobra 13
Coronet Prince (ALQ-179) 13
Compass Hammer 14
Cameo Bluejay 14
VI. FOREIGN TACTICAL LASER WEAPON PROGRAMS 14
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 15
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 16
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has pursued the development of at least ten different tactical
laser weapons that have the potential of blinding individuals. The existence
of most of these programs is not known to the American public or to most of
the U.S. Congress. In fact, the programs are little known even within the U.S.
military, and services responsible for laser weapons seem largely unaware of
the programs in research and development in other services. Further, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense does not appear to have an overview of the program.1
Secrecy and lack of oversight and coordination are thus the hallmarks of the
"family" of U.S. tactical laser weapons.
Blinding lasers have been the subject of international legal discussions for
more than a decade, with the International Committee of the Red Cross long advocating
a ban on such weapons. Human Rights Watch believes that blinding laser weapons
are unnecessarily cruel and injurious, and that the use of blinding laser weapons
is repugnant to the public conscience. The Swedish government has proposed adding
a protocol banning use of blinding laser weapons to the 1980 U.N. Conventional
Weapons Convention2 at the Review Conference to be held this September in Vienna.
While it appears that the protocol will have widespread support (more than twenty
European nations are currently in favor), the U.S. government has thus far expressed
opposition to the proposal.
The Human Rights Watch Arms Project is the first to identify publicly and provide
details on all ten U.S. tactical laser weapon programs. They are code-named:
Laser Countermeasure System, Saber 203, Stingray, Outrider, Dazer, Cobra, Perseus,
Coronet Prince, Compass Hammer and Cameo Bluejay. The function of all these
weapons, as described by the military, is to counter battlefield surveillance
by disrupting optical and electro-optical devices - from binoculars to gunner's
sights to infrared sensors. But it appears that all can also function as blinding
antipersonnel weapons.
The U.S. Army is hoping for a government decision next month (June 1995) to
approve start of a full scale production contract for the portable Laser Countermeasure
System (LCMS), which is mounted on an M-16 rifle.3 It would be the first laser
weapon ever to begin full-scale production in the United States, or, it is believed,
anywhere in the world. This decision seems particularly rushed given the possibility
of an international ban, or at least internationally agreed restrictions, on
laser weapons this fall. There is certainly no particular new "threat"
creating an urgency to go to full-scale production of the LCMS. Moreover, the
Army has admitted that "specific tactics and doctrine have yet to be developed"
for LCMS use.4
Another secret laser weapon - Saber 203 - was actually taken to Somalia by the
U.S. Marine Corps in early 1995. Senior U.S. Department of Defense officials
reportedly halted its experimental use in Somalia at the eleventh hour for "humane
reasons." Skeptics in the military apparently questioned whether there
was either a policy or doctrine governing use of such a weapon.5
The other eight U.S. tactical laser weapon systems are in various stages of
research and development. Dazer, which was a prototype that lost out to LCMS
in development, is perhaps the most dangerous, and is deployed with the U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a "joint" unified command of
the Department of Defense. Stingray and Outrider are under active development
in the Army and Marine Corps with prototypes already in existence. They await
funding for full-scale production. Two Stingray prototypes were deployed, but
not used, in the Gulf War. Perseus appears to be an Army system similar to Saber
203, though currently unfunded. Cobra and Coronet Prince were supposedly cancelled,
but are still being actively "marketed" by their developers and contractors.
The fate of two others - Compass Hammer and Cameo Bluejay - is unknown.
This aggressive state of development of tactical laser weapons within the U.S.
military, which heretofore has been mostly shrouded in secrecy, makes a ban
on tactical laser weapons and on blinding as a method of warfare more urgent
now than ever before. Tactical laser weapon development in other countries has
been difficult to determine because it is often hidden beneath even more levels
of secrecy than in the United States. According to confidential U.S. government
sources, other countries alleged to have blinding laser weapons programs include
Russia, China, France, Britain and Israel. Germany has also been mentioned in
the military literature. The spread of tactical laser weapons - to extremists,
terrorists or guerrilla groups, as well as many nations in conflict - is a very
real likelihood, especially if the systems perfected are small and portable.
The secrecy surrounding tactical laser weapons and the apparent lack of oversight
raises the question of whether national and international negotiations about
these weapons have proceeded only on a partially-and ill-informed basis, particularly
with respect to the nature and scale of actual developments. Nevertheless, the
Review Conference of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention presents a unique
opportunity to effect an international prohibition on an inhumane and unnecessary
weapon system before it has the chance to proliferate. The Human Rights Watch
Arms Project calls on all countries to ban tactical laser weapons and to stop
the development and deployment of these weapons systems now.
II. BACKGROUND ON TACTICAL LASER WEAPONS
The term laser is an acronym for light amplification by the stimulated emission
of radiation. Lasers, of course, have many important non-military functions.
They also have useful and legitimate military purposes, for example in applications
such as guidance, target designation or range-finding. There is, nonetheless,
a clear distinction between these non-weapon laser systems and the ten tactical
laser weapons systems identified by the Human Rights Watch Arms Project. Although
this distinction is evident from U.S. military documents, in many cases the
U.S. and other governments claim otherwise.
The Human Rights Watch Arms Project has chosen to use the term "tactical"
laser weapons to distinguish them from the high energy and directed energy laser
weapon applications most often associated with ballistic missile defenses.6
This report does not address these high energy laser weapons, which do not have
antipersonnel effects.
Interest in tactical laser weapons began in the early 1970s, when technological
advances held out the prospect that small and powerful lasers with offensive
applications could be developed at relatively low cost. U.S. intelligence reports
in the late 1970s also indicated Soviet interest in tactical laser weapons.
Several U.S. Army studies in the early 1980s reached the conclusion that laser
weapons would be "highly effective force multipliers."7
The introduction of lasers in non-weapons applications, as well as advances
in electro-optics such as night vision devices and forward-looking infrared
sensors, provoked the military to evaluate both self-protection and countermeasures.
From the beginning, the U.S. military recognized that the proliferation of lasers
would have adverse effects on "friendly" forces, even in the absence
of laser weapons. There were a number of accidents from inadvertent laser exposure,
numbering some twenty-three major cases as of 1984.8 At least one report speculated
that "incidents of temporary blindness and vision damage ... may have led
research and development establishments to investigate further."9
Work on specific tactical laser weapons began between 1975 and 1976 when Martin
Marietta and Lockheed Sanders (then Sanders Associates) contracted with the
Army to develop laser weapons systems for attack helicopters. The Lockheed prototype,
the ALQ-169 Optical Warning Location/Detection (OWL/D) device, was flight-tested
starting in 1980, but was cancelled in 1986.10 The tank- and helicopter-mounted
C-CLAW (Close Combat Laser Assault Weapon) was developed in the early 1980s
and was cancelled in 1983 because of its excessive weight.11 Focus then shifted
exclusively to ground-based weapons.
The Army continued to fund work by Martin Marietta to develop the Stingray laser
weapons system, and advanced development research began in 1982.12 Three companies
also competed to develop a portable laser weapon: Allied-Signal developed Dazer;
McDonnell-Douglas developed Cobra; and Lockheed Sanders developed the Laser
Countermeasure System (LCMS). Stingray (and its outgrowth Outrider) were eventually
supported as vehicle mounted systems pursued by the Army and Marine Corps, while
the Lockheed LCMS was chosen as the portable system. (See below for additional
details on these and other laser weapon systems).
III. WEAPONS TO BLIND OR TO DESTROY SENSORS?
The United States is quick to state that it "does not possess, nor is it
developing, laser weapons designed or intended primarily to permanently blind
enemy combatants,"13 and that its weapons are "not designed to cause
ocular injury to opposing soldiers."14 However, the actual workings of
the various tactical laser weapons, and the most likely scenarios for their
operation, reveal a great potential for their use against individuals and their
capability to blind.
Even though tactical laser weapons are described as "protective systems"
and intended for "defensive purposes," they counter optical and electro-optical
devices (OEDs) primarily by attacking the opponent's eyes, not through physical
destruction of the OEDs. The U.S. soldier searches for a battlefield surveillance
device then points the laser beam at it. In the case of a simple optical device,
such as a gunner's sight, the laser would be intensified by the optic in front
of the human eye and would shoot back to the human retina in less than one second,
causing eye damage. Depending on the distance between the human eye and the
laser, and the wavelength and intensity of the beam, a pulse might or might
not cause permanent blindness. The U.S. Laser Countermeasure System fires a
beam powerful enough to burn out human retinas from up to 3,000 feet away.15
In the case of an electro-optical device, the laser would work in the same way
a driver's night vision is overwhelmed by bright headlights.16 The sensor is
overloaded, but the laser beam does not have enough power to destroy the sensor.
Temporarily "jammed," enemy soldiers would be forced, the theory goes,
to either repair the electronic device or to switch to observation with non-electronic
optics, where their unprotected eyes would be prey.
It is only in the cases of electro-optical devices such as forward-looking infrared
sensors (FLIRs) or closed circuit camera sensors - where there is a separation
between the sensor and the human eye such as a television screen that delivers
the image from a sensor - that the tactical laser weapon would not "attack"
the person involved.
An examination of military thinking behind use of tactical laser weapons reveals
them to be essentially antipersonnel in nature. The military envisions that
the presence of tactical laser weapons will either deter soldiers from using
OEDs, force soldiers to employ protection devices that will degrade their performance,17
or overwhelm OEDs and provide advantages for the U.S. to follow-on with lethal
attacks.
The claim of some laser weapon proponents that "it is better to blind than
to kill" is inconsistent with the fact that there is no credible non-lethal
scenario for use of tactical laser weapons in conventional warfare. Tactical
laser weapons are merely augmentations of other, lethal weapons; they are electronic
warfare devices that could open up opponents to easier, more successful lethal
attack.18 During conventional military operations, engagements to disrupt electro-optical
systems with laser weapons for long enough periods of time to afford employment
of other conventional weapons would be fundamentally antipersonnel, not anti-sensor,
battles. The target ultimately would be the human, not the electronic system.
Given this, it should be asked whether the only real usefulness for tactical
laser weapons is in their unique ability, under the right conditions, to blind.
IV. BLINDING AS A METHOD OF WARFARE
The eye is the organ most vulnerable to laser radiation. As noted above, how
much damage occurs depends on several factors, but many medical and military
experts believe it is not possible to design a laser that can only temporarily
blind or dazzle. According to one medical specialist, "A laser that could
dazzle toward the end of its range would inevitably cause permanent blindness
nearer the source. Aiming for temporary blindness under battlefield conditions
appears impossible."19 To date, no research by the military has been found
to disprove this conclusion.20
The International Committee of the Red Cross has built up an impressive dossier
of evidence that blinding is more severe and debilitating than most other wounds
inflicted in war.21 Sixty percent of military casualties in war survive and
fully recover over time. Prosthetic devices may be used to regain the functions
of arms or legs. No prosthetic device can replace sight. Sight provides individuals
with 80 to 90 percent of their sensory stimulation. Blinding may lead to a loss
of self-esteem and severe psychological depression, at least in the initial
stages. The impact of blinding could be exaggerated when the injury occurs in
war because the injury is instantaneous and may be accompanied by post-traumatic
stress. The use of laser weapons or their suspected presence during a military
engagement also could increase the general occurrence of combat stress disorder
because laser weapons are a silent and invisible threat.
The U.S. government argues that a prohibition on blinding as a method of warfare
would open up its soldiers to laws of war charges in cases where legitimate
lasers (e.g., rangefinders or target designators) caused incidental eye injury,
or in cases of "collateral" damage.22 Yet, as this report attests,
and as the government even indirectly acknowledges, there are a specific set
of tactical laser weapons distinct from other lasers on the battlefield.23 It
is their use that should, and can be, the focus of discussion.
V. STATUS OF U.S. TACTICAL LASER WEAPON PROGRAMS
There appear to be five active and five dormant U.S. tactical laser weapons
programs. Five tactical laser weapons are virtually fielded in prototype form.
The military is currently seeking approval of a production contract for its
Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) in June 1995 and is awaiting funding for
full-scale production for its Stingray and Outrider weapons. In addition, the
USSOCOM possesses prototypes of the Dazer and Saber 203 laser weapons for "special"
missions.
The surprisingly large number of U.S. tactical laser weapon programs should
not be interpreted as meaning that "the cat is out of the bag" and
there is no hope to prohibit the system. There continues to be significant skepticism
and opposition within the U.S. military to tactical laser weapons. Many do not
perceive a clear and necessary military function for these weapons, particularly
given the expanding range and greater precision of lethal conventional weapons.
The cost of militarily significant lasers, their size and weight, and their
reliability under battlefield conditions have all raised questions in the past.
Indeed, thereis reason to doubt the usefulness of tactical laser weapons on
a modern battlefield given the limited opportunities for their employment.
Deployment of tactical laser weapons has also been stymied because they are
(correctly) considered politically sensitive within the U.S. government. The
result, however, has not been to abandon tactical laser weapon programs, but
rather to drive them further into the "black" - making them mostly
secret. The development of tactical laser weapons appears to have mostly moved
into the realm of "special operations" and "nonlethal" weapons,
instead of their previous, more publicly visible, "conventional" military
status.
Special Missions for Blinding Lasers
It appears that tactical laser weapons have primarily found post-Cold War support
in the U.S. military for "special missions," described as peacekeeping,
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, rather than large-scale conventional
military actions. This means that laser weapons are likely to be used far differently
than originally conceived and often described by supporters. The conventional
missions envisioned for tactical laser weapons - disabling sophisticated electro-optical
and fire control systems, particularly those associated with radar-guided surface-to-air
missiles, armored vehicles with precision main guns, and advanced attack helicopters
- are mostly absent in these special operations scenarios. Before proceeding
with any of its tactical laser weapon programs, the U.S. government should reexamine
whether the justifications it has contemplated as to the military necessity
and legality of these weapons are accurate given the apparent transformation
to use in special operations. Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned that
the likely uses of tactical laser weapons in special operations - such as in
counter-sniper missions - may be inherently antipersonnel in nature, with blinding
the exact intended effect.
Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) (AN/PLQ-4 and AN/PLQ-5)
LCMS is a one-person portable, manually operated, shoulder-fired, battery-powered,
system mounted onto an M-16A3 rifle. It weighs forty-two pounds. Its developer
is Lockheed Sanders (Lockheed-Martin) of Nashua, New Hampshire, and it is managed
by the Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate of the U.S. Army Communications-Electronic
Command, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, with participation by the Air Force and Marine
Corps.
According to Lockheed, LCMS has the "primary objective to detect, jam,
and suppress threat fire control, optical and electro-optical subsystems."24
These subsystems can be moving or stationary, on the ground or in the air. The
U.S. Army states that LCMS "meets the requirement to acquire a system which
can be employed by the individual soldier to find and disrupt threat optical
and electro-optical (OEO) surveillance devices."25
According to the Army, LCMS functions include "acquisition...to identify
threat OED for engagement with either the LCM or by direct/indirect fire weapons;"
and "disruption...to negate the capabilities of threat OED or impair the
vision of an OED operator." (emphasis added) For soldiers using direct
view optics, such as binoculars, the Army concludes, "At maximum ranges,
the LCM may dazzle thethreat operator. At small arms range (1,000 meters or
less), the disruption laser may cause permanent eye injury to the operator,
including blindness."26
Lockheed states that the effective range of LCMS is greater than two kilometers.
The LCMS employs a Class IV laser. Current plans are that LCMS would be issued
to light infantry, armor, cavalry and special operations troops. They would
be distributed on the basis of three systems for each infantry platoon and one
for each scout vehicle. Lockheed states that LCMS also can be mounted on a Bradley
armored fighting vehicle, High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV,
and pronounced "Humvee"), helicopters or small boats. "Typical
scenarios" for use include anti-narcotics operations and hostage rescue,
as well as in decoy and deception operations or for psychological impact.27
Two versions of the LCMS exist, the PLQ-4 "basic" LCMS used in development
testing, and the Phase II PLQ-5 "objective" LCMS. The initial contract
for PLQ-5 research was awarded in February 1992.28 Field testing of the PLQ-5
in the summer of 1994 resulted in negative comments about the system's overall
weight of forty-two pounds,29 and the PLQ-5 is slated to alleviate these initial
testing concerns.
According to the Army, $22 million has been spent on the LCMS program thus far.
The Army hopes for a development and production decision in June 1995 to continue
with the PLQ-5. The initial production contract in a planned $80 million procurement
program would support the purchase of fifty PLQ-5s, out of about 2,500 desired
by the Army.30
Saber 203 Grenade Shell Laser Intruder Countermeasure System
The Air Force's Phillips Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico developed Saber
203, "a laser system that can temporarily blind or impair the vision of
enemy soldiers, reducing their ability to fight."31 It is suspected as
having been developed for use by special operations forces as well as by Air
Force security police. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project has identified the
Saber 203 as the system deployed to Somalia with the Marine Corps in early 1995,
although it appears that the Saber 203 is now controlled by the USSOCOM.
The Air Force describes the Saber 203 laser weapons system as "lightweight,
compact, and extremely simple to operate." The Saber 203 uses a standard
40mm M-203 grenade launcher attached to an M-16 rifle. It consists of two parts;
the laser itself, which is the actual grenade; and a small control box snappedunderneath
the grenade launcher. A button on the box's side acts as an external trigger
that fires the high-brightness diode laser grenade. The Air Force maintains
that the laser operates "well below the Maximum Permissible Exposure (ME)
at the attend range, 50 to 250 meters."32
According to the Air Force, the laser light causes glare, similar to the effect
of looking at bright headlights at night, and flash blinding, similar to looking
into a camera's flashbulb. The glare and flash blinding "can impair an
adversary's ability to aim or reload a weapon, open a door or gate, plant or
arm explosives, drive a vehicle, or leave the area." The Air Force also
notes that the system "can also be useful to law enforcement agencies for
helping subdue or control criminals."33
Though much more information is not known, Saber 203 is similar to the Army's
Perseus system described below (Saber 203 was developed by the Air Force Phillips
Laboratory while Perseus was developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory).
Though a Saber 203 prototype was offered to the Marines in Somalia and appears
to be under the control of the USSOCOM, the Defense Department states that the
system is "unfunded."34
Dazer
Dazer was a competitor for the Army's portable laser weapon contract awarded
to Lockheed Sanders for the LCMS. The program was subsequently taken over by
USSOCOM, which now possesses the prototype Dazers and may be secretly sponsoring
further procurement. Dazer is a portable rifle-like, shoulder-fired, non-scanning,
manually operated tactical laser weapon.35 According to USSOCOM, the Dazer prototype
"is not routinely issued for training and will only be issued as a result
of USSOCOM SOJ3 [Director of Operations] direction. The Dazer is normally reserved
for operational missions."36
The system, which is battery powered and self-contained, was developed under
contract for the Army by Allied-Signal Electro-Optical Products Division, Westlake,
California.37 It consists of a ten pound laser rifle, a twenty-three pound electronics
package, a battery pack, and an optical sight (Simrad KN-200 or KN-250).38 Dazer
employs a short-range (about one kilometer) near infrared spectrum alexandrite
laser beam,and was tested around 1989.39 Dazer's battery life is in excess of
1,000 individual shots, and the system may be fired single-shot or in a burst
of up to fifty shots per minute.40
According to USSOCOM, there are no approved safety procedures for Dazer. It
warns in its internal Fact Sheet that:
C The system can be highly dangerous to users.
C The Dazer is a high powered Class IV laser - the laser beam is hazardous to
the eyes and skin.
C The Dazer operates at peak power of 1600 amps at 1450 volts. This voltage
is lethal.41
Dazer is the unnamed system the Office of the Secretary of Defense referred
to in its March 27, 1995 letter to Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative
Lane Evans when it stated, "Another laser system, intended for special
missions (not battlefield use), can blind and is operational in very limited
quantities."42 No additional details are known about current Dazer funding.
Stingray Combat Protection System (AN/VLQ-7)
The Stingray is the least secret of the tactical laser weapon systems. Two prototypes
of Stingray were deployed in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, though they were
never used. The U.S. Army states that Stingray is:
a tactical laser system integrated on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and designed
to acquire and defeat threat direct fire control systems. Stingray increases
the effectiveness and survivability of the Bradley crew and other friendly forces
in the area by employing in-band laser energy to acquire and disable threat
fire control systems..."43
Stingray detects, tracks, and counters optical and electro-optical devices on
tanks, combat vehicles, and other ground and airborne systems "beyond the
threat's effective [conventional weapons] ranges."44 The weapon works by
scanning for a sensor with a low-power near infrared spectrum beam (a novel
solid-state neodymium laser), reflecting a small fraction of the light back
upon entering an optical system, and then instantaneously increasing the level
of laser energy to overload or jam the sensor.
Stingray was developed by Martin Marietta Electronics and Missiles Group of
Orlando, Florida, for the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Ft.
Monmouth, New Jersey. General Electric (GE) was the subcontractor for the actual
laser. The 350-pound system consists of four components:
(1) sensor assembly with optics, stabilization, and high resolution detector;
(2) laser transmitter; (3) commander's controls and display; and (4) system
electronics which contain signal processing, built-in test, host vehicle interface
and target handoff. The system operates in three modes - automatic, semi-automatic
(man-in-the-loop), and manual...45
The Stingray program entered advanced development in 1982. A prototype of the
first Stingray was delivered to the Army in 198646 and tested for more than
thirty-six months. A second prototype was assembled for the Gulf War and both
were deployed. They were not tested during the ground war, according to the
Army, because of the short duration of the conflict.47
As of 1995, Martin Marietta is completing work on the three-year $68.4 million
"Advanced Technology Demonstration" (ATD) contract for the Stingray.
Using the two field-ready prototypes, Martin Marietta evaluated the tactical
utility and operational effectiveness of the laser, as well as its safe operation.48
The Stingray program is unfunded in the FY 1996 Army budget request, but the
program can move into full scale production if funding were made available.
According to the Army, "The systems are planned for integration into the
Experimental Forces (EXFOR) as part of Task Force XXI. Future plans will depend
on the outcome of this exercise."49
Outrider Combat Protection System
Outrider is a multi-faceted reconnaissance and surveillance system incorporating
the Martin Marietta-GE Stingray laser, and under development for the Marine
Corps. The program is managed by the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command's
Stingray program office, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. Outrider is integrated on
a HMMWV ("Humvee") wheeled vehicle for use in scout and reconnaissance
missions. The system consists of a passive surveillance suite (forward-looking
infrared sensor and low-light level TV), navigational and communications equipment,
and the Stingray laser.
According to Martin Marietta, Outrider is intended as a "nonlethal technology
option for low intensity conflicts and special operations."50 According
to the U.S. Army, "it is capable of both active and passive target acquisition
and has an active target countermeasure."51
Outrider is an "Advanced Technology Demonstration" (ATD) that will
be completed in 1995. The Marine Corps is funding the demonstration of the prototype.
According to the Army, it is "refining theStingray requirement to include
a heavy and light variant that will include the Outrider concept." Still,
future plans for Outrider in the Army are not decided.52
Perseus Optical Munition
The Perseus "optical flash" 40mm rifle grenade projectile is similar
to the Saber 203 developed by the Air Force. Perseus was developed by the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) as part of its "disabling technologies"
program. It is managed by the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering
Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. Perseus works when the "Light from
an explosion-induced shock-wave is used to pump an inexpensive plastic compact
laser (CL) 'bullet' or 'optical flash' device..."53 The grenade's pulsed
chemical laser would put out a flash of intense white and laser light brilliant
enough to temporarily blind people and sensors.54
The Army officially states that the Perseus program was cancelled in 1992,55
but LANL was reported to be testing a more compact prototype in May 1993,56
and sources state that LANL is still actively pursuing sponsorship and funding.
Cobra
McDonnell-Douglas Electronic Systems Co. of McLean, Virginia, developed the
Cobra for the Army. It is a portable, rifle-like, shoulder-fired, manually operated,
non-scanning tactical laser weapon. Cobra was tested in 198957 and competed
for the LCMS contract that was awarded to Lockheed Sanders. Cobra likely employs
a diode-pumped neodymium laser (in the near infrared spectrum).58 U.S. military
sources have indicated to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project that McDonnell-Douglas
is still actively pursuing sponsorship to continue development and production
of Cobra.
Coronet Prince (ALQ-179)
This airborne advanced Electro-optical Countermeasures Pod was developed by
Westinghouse Electric Corp., in Baltimore, Maryland, for the Air Force. Development
began in 1979, in competition with the Martin-Marietta ALQ-180, and the prototype
was completed in 1985. According to one report, the prototype used a
scanning laser to illuminate the ground and a close-circuit TV camera to detect
energy or the 'glint' reflected from optics... Actual details regarding how
the Westinghouse system suppresses optics has not been released, but is believed
to involve a high-power, blue-green laser that is aimed at the target, degrading
optical equipment.
This report noted that the program was terminated in 1991: "Due to other
budgetary priorities, USAF has put off full-scale development, though basic
research and engineering efforts continue."59
Compass Hammer
This optical countermeasure system associated with Coronet Prince was developed
for the Air Force under a secret program. No other details are available.60
A 1993 report stated that a classified Air Force program was under way to fit
a tactical laser weapon onto the F-15E Strike Eagle "for precisely locating
and blinding enemy electro-optical systems."61 The Human Rights Watch Arms
Project suspects that this system is either Compass Hammer or the Coronet Prince
system mentioned above.
Cameo Bluejay
The Cameo Bluejay is a helicopter-mounted tactical laser weapon developed by
Sanders Associates (Lockheed Sanders), and a spin-off of the Army's ALQ-169
Optical Warning Location/Detection (OWL/D) device. Technical problems led to
cancellation of Cameo Bluejay in 1989.62 It is not known whether Cameo Bluejay
or other derivatives have been revived for helicopter use.
VI. FOREIGN TACTICAL LASER WEAPON PROGRAMS
According to confidential U.S. government sources, Russia, China, Britain, France
and Israel are known to have, or alleged to have, tactical laser weapon programs.
Germany has also been mentioned in the military literature.63 A Pentagon source
told one reporter that "several European countries are perfecting laser
technologies 'suitable for application to weapons systems for blinding human
eyes.'"64 A source told the Human Rights Watch Arms Project that France
had purchased a former Soviet battlefield laser and proposed using it as a counter-sniper
weapon in Bosnia, but that its use was rejected.
Britain has deployed a ship-based laser, known as the Laser Dazzle Sight (LDS)
or Outfit DEC since the early 1980s. The British laser system is intended to
produce a dazzling effect on the cockpit screen oftargeted aircraft or helicopters.
Outfit DEC also has been configured for ground use, and reportedly has been
fielded in tanks and armored vehicles.65
According to a 1992 U.S. Army report, the Soviet Union is thought to have developed
(and so passed on at least to the Russian Federation) "significant numbers
of similar type systems" to the U.S. Stingray in the form of an armored
vehicle-mounted laser weapon.66 The same report notes that China has a research
and development program for this type of weapon. A 1987 Pentagon report stated,
The USSR has established a very large and well-funded multi-ministerial program
to develop strategic and tactical laser weapons... The tactical laser program
has progressed to where battlefield laser weapons could soon be deployed with
Soviet forces. The Soviets have the technological capability to deploy low-power
laser weapons - at least for antipersonnel use and against soft targets...67
The Soviet naval-based Squeezebox laser (NATO designation) was reported in this
time frame to have anti-sensor and antipersonnel functions.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
C The U.S. government should not approve full-scale production of the Laser
Countermeasure System (LCMS) when the decision is before it in June 1995.
C The United States should cancel all ongoing research and development of tactical
laser weapons because of their potential use as blinding antipersonnel weapons.
Existing prototypes of tactical laser weapon systems should be destroyed.
C All other nations, including Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Israel, should abandon any existing research and development programs for
tactical laser weapons and should destroy existing prototypes.
C The United States should review its policies, rules of engagement, and doctrine
with respect to laser weapons, and should adopt a firm prohibition on the use
of lasers for the purpose of blinding.
C Nations which are parties to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention should
adopt a new protocol at the September 1995 Review Conference which would prohibit
blinding as a method of warfare and ban blinding tactical laser weapons.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
William M. Arkin, a weapons consultant to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project,
was the primary researcher and writer for this report. Additional research and
writing was provided by Ann Peters, a London-based researcher for the Arms Project
on blinding lasers. The report was edited by Stephen Goose, the program director
of the Arms Project. Kathleen Bleakley, Arms Project research assistant, and
Selamawit Demeke, Arms Project associate, assisted with research and prepared
the report for publication.
The Arms Project gratefully acknowledges funding for its work on blinding lasers
from the S.H. Cowell Foundation, Ruth Mott Fund, and Ploughshares Fund, as well
as general support funds from the Rockefeller Foundation.
Human Rights Watch Arms Project
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to
monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights
in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories of
the Helsinki accords. It is supported by contributions from private individuals
and foundations worldwide. It accepts no government funds, directly or indirectly.
Kenneth Roth is the executive director; Cynthia Brown is the program director;
Holly J. Burkhalter is the advocacy director; Ann S. Johnson is the development
director; Gara LaMarche is the associate director: Juan E. Méndez is
general counsel; Susan Osnos is the communications director; and Derrick Wong
is the finance and administration director. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair
of the board and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair. Its Arms Project was established
in 1992 to monitor and prevent arms transfers to governments or organizations
that commit gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and
the rules of war and promote freedom of information regarding arms transfers
worldwide. Joost R. Hiltermann is the director; Stephen D. Goose is the program
director; Ann Peters is research associate; Kathleen A. Bleakley and Ernst Jan
Hogendoorn are research assistants; William M. Arkin is a consultant; and Selamawit
Demeke is associate.
1 Letter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)
H. Allen Holmes to Representative Lane Evans and Senator Patrick Leahy, March
27, 1995. This letter states that there are only two systems within the Department
of Defense.
2 Officially the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscriminate Effects (1980), it is also sometimes known as the Inhumane Weapons
Convention.
3 This would be the initial production contract in a planned $80 million procurement
program and would fund the purchase of fifty LCMS weapons, out of about 2,500
desired by the Army.
4 U.S. Army, Questions and Answers for Chris Hanson, Hearst Newspapers, April
14, 1995.
5 Eric Schmitt, "Now, to the Shores of Somalia with Beanbag Guns and Goo,"
New York Times, February 15, 1995. The senior Defense Department official quoted
further said," I know that (the rationale) sounds weird, but we had some
qualms given the lack of experience we've had with them."
6 With President Reagan's articulation of the "Star Wars" concept
in March 1983, new enthusiasm was found for directed energy and laser weapons
to attack satellites and ballistic missiles. Most of the high energy laser work
in the Navy and the Air Force was taken over by the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization in 1984, and continues to be pursued as part of the ballistic missile
defense program. See Vincent P. Grimes, "Lasers as Naval Weapons,"
Wings of Gold, Summer 1993, p. 52.
7 U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (Hock, Lyons, et al.), "Military Implications
of Laser Employment by the Soviets (MILES)," Study Report CAA-SR-80-8,
1981; U.S. Army, TRADOC Systems Analysis Agency, "Forward Area Directed
Energy Weapons (FADEW) Study," TRASANA TR-33-83, 1983. Both studies have
been requested under the Freedom of Information Act.
8 See Dr. John A. Wolfe, Captain, U.S. Public Health Service, "Laser Retinal
Injury," Letterman Army Institute of Research, Institute Report No. 177,
June 1984 (ADA144 187); and John A. Wolfe, "Laser retinal injury,"
Military Medicine, Vol. 150 (1985), No. 4, pp. 177-185.
9 Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Electronic Warfare,
Airborne Electro-Optical Countermeasures (February 1993), updated April 1995.
10 Ibid.
11 Jeff Hecht, "Lasers Designed to Blind," New Scientist, August 8,
1992, p. 28.
12 U.S. Army, "Weapon Systems - United States Army 1992," p. 19.
13 Letter, Asst. Sec. Def. Holmes to Rep. Evans and Sen. Leahy, March 27, 1995.
See also, Pat Cooper, "Congressmen Urge Ban on Using Lasers to Blind,"
Defense News, January 16-22, 1995.
14 U.S. Army, Response to press query by Chris Hanson, Washington correspondent,
Hearst News Service, Subject: Stingray System, March 21, 1995. Describing the
LCMS, the Army further states that it "does not have sufficient energy
to blind enemy troops at tactically significant ranges." (emphasis added);
U.S. Army, Questions and Answers submitted by Chris Hanson, Hearst News Service,
April 14, 1995.
15 Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum,
Subject: AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure System; Law of War Review, September
16, 1994, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
16 Hecht, "Lasers Designed to Blind," p. 31.
17 At present, no 100 percent effective protective measures against laser weapons
have been developed. There are goggles that protect against a laser emitting
a single wavelength, but it is possible to design a laser system that can fire
a variety of wavelengths.
18 In a legal memorandum, the Pentagon acknowledges this by stating that tactical
laser weapons would never be used at ranges where the opponent was not also
subject to "permanent loss of vision or considerably greater injury, including
death, from lawful weapons other than lasers." See Department of the Army,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum, Subject: AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure
System; Law of War Review, September 16, 1994, released under the Freedom of
Information Act.
19 John Marshall, "A Horrifying New Laser Weapon That the World Should
Ban Now," International Herald Tribune, April 12, 1995.
20 See, for example, U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Abstract,
Laser Photonics Technology, Inc., "Chemical Processing of Novel Multifunctional
Materials for Sensor Protection Against Laser Threats," Final Report, September
15, 1990-May 15, 1991, TR-91-05870; U.S. Army Natick Research, Development and
Engineering Center, Abstract, "Proceedings of the International Symposium
on Nonlinear Optical Polymers for Soldier Survivability," June 13-14, 1989,
Final Report, September 1990, Natick/TR-90/028; U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace
Medicine, Abstract, "Laser Eye Protection," Interim Report, January
1990, USAFSAM-PROC-89-27 (ADA219659).
21 ICRC, Blinding Weapons: Reports of the Meetings of Experts Convened by the
ICRC on Battlefield Laser Weapons 1989-1991 (Geneva: ICRC, 1993).
22 See Letter, President Bill Clinton, to Representatives Ron Dellums and Lane
Evans, and Senator Patrick Leahy, February 1, 1995, released under the Freedom
of Information Act.
23 Legal reviews, as required by DOD directive, were done by the Army on at
least Stingray and LCMS "to ensure compliance with the international legal
obligations of the United States, including the law of war." Department
of the Army, AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure System; Law of War Review, September
16, 1994. See also, Department of the Army, Legal Review of the Combat Protection
System AN/VLQ-7 (STINGRAY), June 10, 1991.
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, "Defense Acquisitions
Management Policies and Procedures," February 1991 (with Change 1, February
26, 1993), p. 2-10, states, "All actions of the Department of Defense with
respect to the acquisition and procurement of weapons, and their intended use
in armed conflict, will be consistent with the obligations by the U.S. government
under all applicable treaties, with customary international law, and in particular,
with the laws of war." (emphasis added).
DODI 5000.2 replaces DODI 5500.15, "Review of Legality of Weapons Under
International Law," which was cancelled. Legal reviews are required for
weapons, not systems.
24 Lockheed Sanders Fact Sheet, Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) AN/PLQ-5,
1994.
25 U.S. Army Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate Fact Sheet, "Laser
Countermeasure System," (no date, obtained April 1995), released under
the Freedom of Information Act.
26 Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum,
Subject: AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure System; Law of War Review, September
16, 1994, released under the Freedom of Information Act.
27 Lockheed Sanders Fact Sheet, Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) AN/PLQ-5,
1994.
28 U.S. Army Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate Fact Sheet, "Laser
Countermeasure System," no date (1995), released under the Freedom of Information
Act.
29 Mark Hewish, "Battlefield Lasers: The Race Between Action & Countermeasure,"
International Defense Review, February 1995 (Vol. 28, No. 2), p. 39.
30 U.S. Army, Answers to Questions submitted by Chris Hanson, Hearst Newspapers,
March 14, 1995; Mark Hewish, "Battlefield Lasers: The Race Between Action
& Countermeasure," International Defense Review, February 1995 (Vol.
28, No. 2), p. 39; "U.S. Army to Award Laser Contract in '94," Defense
News, May 24-30, 1993, p. 2.
31 Fact Sheet from the United States Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command,
Office of Public Affairs, Phillips Laboratory, "Saber 203 Grenade Shell
Laser Intruder Countermeasure System," (no date, obtained May 1995).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 The Defense Department has acknowledged in a letter to Congressman Lane Evans
and Senator Patrick Leahy that "One presently unfunded program investigated
the potential use of lasers to temporarily impair vision" and that this
"temporarily vision-impairing system...was deployed during the Somalia
operation, but it was decided not to use it for that purpose during the operation;"
Letter, Asst. Sec. Def. Holmes, to Rep. Evans and Sen. Leahy, March 27, 1995.
35 U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Fact Sheet, "Dazer System
NSN 6660-00-X01-6666," (no date, obtained May 1995).
36 Ibid.
37 Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, "Blinding Lasers: the Nastiest
Weapon?," Military Technology (MILTECH), March 1990.
38 USSOCOM Dazer Fact Sheet.
39 Hecht, "Lasers Designed to Blind," p. 28; Neil Munro, "Army
Tests Hand-Held Laser Rifles: But Existing Lasers Already Threaten Troops, Experts
Say," Defense News, March 5, 1990.
40 USSOCOM Dazer Fact Sheet.
41 Ibid.
42 Letter, Asst. Sec. Def. Holmes to Rep. Evans and Sen. Leahy, March 27, 1995.
43 U.S. Army, Response to press query by Chris Hanson, Hearst News Service,
Subject: Stingray System, March 21, 1995.
44 U.S. Army, "Weapon Systems - United States Army 1992," p. 19.
45 U.S. Army, "Weapon Systems - United States Army 1992," p. 19; see
also Hecht, "Lasers Designed to Blind," p. 28.
46 Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Electronic Warfare,
Airborne Electro-Optical Countermeasures (February 1993), April 1995.
47 U.S. Army, "Weapon Systems - United States Army 1992," p. 19.
48 Martin Marietta Fact Sheet, "Stingray," January 1995.
49 Letter, U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command, to William M. Arkin,
April 27, 1995, in response to Freedom of Information Act request.
50 Martin Marietta Fact Sheet, "Outrider Combat Protection System,"
1994.
51 U.S. Army, Response to press query by Chris Hanson, Hearst News Service,
Subject: Stingray System, March 21, 1995.
52 Letter, U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command, to William M. Arkin,
April 27, 1995, in response to Freedom of Information Act request.
53 Richard Kokoski, "Non-lethal Weapons: A Case Study of New Technology
Developments," in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press, 1994),
p. 375.
54 The concept of an optical flash round was described (though not by name)
in "Nonlethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, December 7, 1992, p. 50), and (under the name "Battlefield
Optical Munition") in Joseph A. Dowden, "Non-Lethal Defense Options,"
Armed Forces Journal International, October 1993, p. 42.
55 Letter, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Armament Research,
Development and Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, to William
M. Arkin, March 17, 1995, in response to Freedom of Information Act request.
56 Andrew C. Tillman, "Weapons for the 21st Century Soldier," International
Defense Review, January 1994 (Vol. 27, No. 1), p. 34.
57 Munro, "Army Tests Hand-Held Laser Rifles."
58 Hecht, "Lasers Designed to Blind," p. 28.
59 Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Electronic Warfare,
Airborne Electro-Optical Countermeasures (February 1993), updated April 1995.
60 Ibid.
61 David A. Fulghum, "Wild Weasels May Get Optics-Blinding Laser,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 8, 1993, p. 25.
62 Ibid.
63 Paul Beaver, "Technology Comes of Age," Jane's Defence Weekly,
January 13, 1990.
64 Christopher Hanson, "Debate Over Use of Laser Weapons," Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, April 17, 1995, p. 3.
65 Vincent P. Grimes, "Lasers as Naval Weapons," Wings of Gold, Summer
1993, pp. 52-53; FI/DMS, Electronic Warfare. The LDS was developed by Irwin
Desman Ltd., Letchworth, Hertfordshire.
66 U.S. Army, "Weapons Systems - United States Army 1992," March 1992,
p. 19.
67 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987, p. 112.